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Introduction
The right of sick or injured people to at least have a day in court is fundamental to
the notion of equal protection and should not vary depending on the result of any election
or misguided legislative whim. The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, which states in part that “no state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,”1 would seem to
further the notion held by the founders of our country that all people are created equal
and possess certain inalienable rights to be regulated by state and local governments in
the same way.2 However, state legislatures, often with the acquiescence of courts, have
done their best to mold and modify this freedom, often with awkward results.
An area where such awkward results have been particularly apparent is state
statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. Statutes of limitation are statutes in civil and
criminal codes which set forth the maximum period of time, after certain events, in which
legal proceedings based on those events may be commenced. Statutes of repose, on the
other hand, extinguish any right to a cause of action after a proscribed amount of time –
even if the potential claimant has no knowledge that the potential cause of action may
exist.3 While this paper will focus mainly on the application of the 14th Amendment’s
equal protection clause to state statutes of repose, this paper also will examine statutes of

1

See United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 2.
The 5th Amendment Due Process clause has been interpreted as containing an equal protection
requirement applicable to the federal government. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
3
See page 3, infra, for further discussion of statutes of repose and statutes of limitation.
2

2

limitation as a necessary complement in any discussion of statutes of repose.4
This paper attempts to present a balanced analysis of the reasons why many
commentators find that statutes of repose are anathema to the principle of equal
protection under the law; and why many commentators argue that time periods for
statutes of repose should, at the very least, be lengthened, if not phased out altogether.
First, this paper will argue that a statute of repose that only applies to a particular type of
legal claim is invalid under the equal protection clause because it irrationally
discriminates against only particular types of legal claims, in violation of the rational
basis test for equal protection. Secondly, this paper argues that if a state has a statute or
statutes of repose that apply/applies to all legal claims, such a statute or statutes, in order
to comply with the equal protection clause’s rational basis test, must establish a
reasonable repose period for each type of legal claim, with the repose period for each
type of claim required to be based upon the relevant latency or discovery period for the
disease or injury upon which a particular legal claim is based.
Statutes of Repose and Statutes of Limitation
Statutes of limitation “are found and approved in all systems of enlightened
jurisprudence.”5 They represent the legislative judgment that an adversary should have
reasonable notice to defend within a specified period of time and therefore “the right to
be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.”6
Statutes of limitation “find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in
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logic.”7 They “are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate
between the just and the unjust claim, or the avoidable and unavoidable delay.”8 The plea
of limitations is considered “a meritorious defense, in itself serving a public interest.”9
Statutes of repose, however, are different from statutes of limitation. A statute of
repose establishes a “right not to be sued,” rather than a “right to sue.”10 A statute of
repose “limits the time within which an action may be brought and is unrelated to the
accrual of any cause of action.”11 Statutes of limitation have been described as affecting
only a party’s remedy for a cause of action, while the running of a statute of repose serves
to “nullify both the remedy and the right.”12 A statute of repose begins to run after a
“triggering event,” which is the event that “starts the clock running on the time allowed
for filing suit.”13
There is also a procedural difference between statutes of limitation and statutes of
repose: “Statutes of limitation, though they can have a material effect on the outcome of a
case, are usually characterized as procedural.”14 On the other hand, “a statute of repose is
substantive . . . it relates to the jurisdiction of the court and any failure to commence the
action within the applicable time period extinguishes the right itself and divests the ...
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court of any subject matter jurisdiction which it might otherwise have.”15 These
distinctions are important when distinguishing between statutes of limitation and statutes
of repose for purposes of equal protection analysis or when a federal court considers
frequently litigated questions involving an Erie issue (i.e., whether a federal court, sitting
under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, should follow a state statute of repose or
limitation).16
Statutes of limitation and statutes of repose both serve to meet the goals described
in the proceeding paragraphs. However, statutes of repose possess more of an air of
absolute finality and in this way can be seen to have evolved beyond the protection
afforded to wrongdoers by statutes of limitation. In Texas, for example, statutes of repose
are considered to “represent a response by the legislature to the inadequacy of traditional
statutes of limitations.”17 Statutes of repose “terminate any right of action after a specific
time has elapsed, regardless of whether or not there has as yet been an injury”18 to the
plaintiff. A repose statute “begins to run from the occurrence of some event other than the
event of an injury that gives rise to a cause of action and, therefore, bars a cause of action
before the injury occurs.”19 Also, “a statute of limitation ... cuts off the remedy” whereas
“a statute of repose limits the time during which a cause of action can arise and usually
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runs from an act of a defendant. It abolishes the cause of action after the passage of time
even though the cause of action may not have occurred yet.”20
Much criticism has been leveled at the absurd results created by statutes of repose
when a claimant's potential claim is barred before a claimant even has reason to know of
a potential cause of action against the defendant.21 For example, a person could be
exposed to a chemical or pollutant that does not result in any immediate symptoms of
disease. After a period of time longer than that proscribed by a statute of repose has run,
this person discovers that they now suffer from a disease or illness as a result of the
exposure. Since the elapsed time period is longer than the period allowed under the
applicable statute of repose to bring suit, any claim filed in a court by that person is thus
extinguished by the applicable statute of repose. Courts have stated somewhat obtusely
that the statute of repose:
requires an unfortunate result . . . especially since plaintiff’s injury was
not ascertainable before the statute extinguished her right to bring the
action, and her suit would have been timely had the amended statute not
intervened. It is clear, however, that the legislature has the authority to set
statutes of limitation, that the classification of ‘health care providers’ is
justified and reasonable, and without constitutional infirmity.22
Despite this illogical result, courts have declared that “it is clear that the legislature has
the constitutional power to enact statutes of repose which, by definition, have the possible
effect of barring a claim before it occurs.”23 Many courts wash their hands of
constitutional challenges to statutes of repose by stating brusquely that the results of these
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statutes mark a legislative decision, and “its wisdom is not the concern of courts.”24 In
addition, one court has stated that “the very purpose of a statute of repose is to create a
settled time when such losses can no longer be subject to claims. Ample authority
establishes a governmental right to do this even though harsh results can occur under any
such arbitrary time limit.”25
Statutes of repose have been enacted in some states for products liability cases,
for medical treatment cases, for claims arising from many types of chemical and
environmental exposures, and for a wide range of other potential tort claims involving the
potential development of future injuries from various causes.26 A majority of states have
also passed statutes of repose limiting the time in which an action can be brought against
architects, builders, and material suppliers for defects arising from improvements to real
property.27 Statutes of repose are coming under more criticism of late, including a recent
note which discusses the application of statutes repose to actions where liability arises
due to improvements to real property as well as to certain environmental and toxic tort
claims.28
Statutes of repose take many forms. Usually, they establish a total ban on
particular types of suits after a set period of time, which can range anywhere from a few
years to a few decades. In Texas for example, “a claimant must commence a products
liability action against a manufacturer or seller of a product before the end of 15 years
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after the date of sale of the product by the defendant.”29 In Tennessee, the legislature has
enacted a ten-year statute of repose for products liability claims against product
manufacturers and sellers.30
States offer a variety of reasons for statutes of repose, many of which are fairly
similar. In Tennessee, the preamble to the state’s product liability statute of repose
suggests a legislature concerned about “the effect of increased insurance premiums and
increased claims” upon the cost of products as a result of “manufacturers, wholesalers
and retailers passing the cost of the premium to the consumer” and about “certain product
manufacturers [being] discouraged from continuing to provide and manufacture such
products because of the high cost and possible unavailability of product insurance.”31 In
North Dakota courts have observed that “it is necessary to protect the public interest by
enacting measures designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to
provide products liability insurance.”32 Minnesota has determined that “by setting forth a
15-year period of repose, the statute helps avoid litigation and stale claims which could
occur many years after an improvement to real property has been designed, manufactured
or installed.”33
It is possible that the types of arguments discussed in the previous paragraph
might be extended to suits against any type of business or professional for alleged
tortious conduct that involves any type of environmental or toxic tort claim. Since any
defendant who is held liable for tortuous conduct may face increased insurance premiums

29

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.012(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05) quoted in Burlington Northern
& Santa Fe R. Co. v. Poole Chemical Co., 419 F.3d at 358.
30
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103 (2005).
31
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103 (2005); See also Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d at 1137.
32
N.D. Cent. Code, § 28-01-01 (2005).
33
Sartori v. Harnischfeger, 432 N.W.2d 448, at 453 (Minn. 1988).

8

and/or reduced profits that may increase the price it charges for its product and/or service
or decrease the amount it pays its employees in salaries and wages, these facts would
seem to offer strong policy reasons for having a broad, generic statute of repose that is
not limited to specific types of legal claims against any specific profession or industry.
Exceptions to Statutes of Repose
Even though statutes of repose are presumed valid under the equal protection
clause, many states provide an exception from statutes of repose where claims based on
injuries from exposure to asbestos are involved. The typical asbestos exception mirrors
Tennessee’s, which states: “the foregoing limitation of actions shall not apply to any
action resulting from exposure to asbestos.”34 The reason for this exception to the statute
of repose, as stated by the 6th Circuit, is that “we think the statute’s exemption of
asbestos-related injuries has a rational basis if only because such injuries often take
considerably longer than ten years to manifest themselves.”35 Another exception to
Tennessee's statute of repose was added in 1993 for actions arising from the use of
silicone gel breast implants, ostensibly due to the cruel nature of a claim being
extinguished even though the potential claimant had no knowledge of any problem until
after the period allowed by the statute.36
In light of these exceptions to statutes of repose that some states have enacted,
potential claimants in those states seeking redress for non-exempted injuries have
attempted to argue that other medical conditions and diseases are analogous to asbestos
and that such exception provisions violate equal protection by not including such non-
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exempted injuries.37 These claimants argue that if discoverability is the reason for an
asbestos exception, then logically any claim where discoverability problems are involved
should be granted a similar exception.
The fairly uniform court response to these arguments has been that “we find
unconvincing appellants’ argument that ‘there is absolutely no rational basis for
exempting asbestos-related injuries from the ten year absolute bar for bringing a products
liability claim and not exempting other long term continuing type injuries such as injuries
relating to exposure to low level radiation.”38 Yet this response seems to beg the question,
offering an answer without a rational supporting explanation. If problems with the
discoverability of a legal claim are the basis for such exceptions, then there should be an
exception from a statute of repose for any legal claim which could not reasonably be
discovered during the repose period - and therefore the repose period for a particular legal
claim should be based upon the reasonable period required for a person to discover the
existence of the legal claim.
Another argument, in favor of expanding the asbestos exception to other similar
claims, has been that “the right of access to the courts is a fundamental right” so any
classification “arbitrarily and capriciously distinguishing between asbestos-related
claims” and any other type of exposure is a violation of equal protection under the law.39
Courts have been content in denying any such similarity, since recognition of such a
similarity would require exemptions for claims based on symptoms similar to the
asbestos and other similar exceptions, even though not within the exact specific statutory
exception. In Tennessee, for example, a state statute of repose prescribes that “in any
37
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event, the action must be brought within ten (10) years from the date on which the
product was first purchased for use or consumption (emphasis added).”40 The only
conclusion offered by a court in support of this statute’s discrimination is that “although
the conclusion may be harsh, we are bound by the plain language of the Tennessee
legislature” as “the plain language of the statute allows for no exceptions.”41 The only
consolation offered by the court is “crocodile tears”: “the court recognizes and regrets
appellants’ losses.”42
The harshness of literal interpretation of the language of exception provisions in
statutes of repose is based upon a lack of recognition that the role of a court should not be
simply to be a rubber stamp for the legislature. Challenges to statutes of repose are
further exacerbated by the burden presented to a person challenging the constitutionality
of a statute since “a statute is presumed constitutional unless proven otherwise beyond a
reasonable doubt.”43 Although the exceptions to statutes of repose carved out for asbestos
exposure and silicon gel breast implants are limited, even with these exceptions
seemingly restricting the overall negative impacts of statutes of repose as a whole, most
arguments based on statutes of repose being unconstitutional, as a denial of equal
protection, have fared poorly.
Overview of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
There are two clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment that may be invoked when a
person seeks to have state legislation declared unconstitutional. The first states that no
39
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state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”44
The second declares that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”45 In explaining equal protection, Justice Robert Jackson
stated that “courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to
require that laws be equal in operation.”46 Equal application of the law is necessary since
“we are much more likely to find arbitrariness in the regulation of the few than of the
many.”47
In describing equal protection requirements, Justice Jackson wrote: “I regard it as
a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal Government must exercise their
powers so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable
differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation.”48 Justice Thurgood Marshall, a
champion of expanded equal protection, wrote that equal protection “mandates nothing
less than that ‘all persons similarly circumstanced [sic] shall be treated alike.’”49
However, application and analysis of equal protection principles by the courts are not as
simple and straightforward as the general concept of equal treatment might suggest.
Current equal protection analysis by federal and state courts has identified three
different levels of classification for governmental regulation, with each of the three levels
being subject to separate standards of scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Rational
basis scrutiny is the test that is usually used to evaluate whether a statute complies with
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equal protection requirements; the rational basis test requires a statute to have a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest.50 Under intermediate scrutiny, which applies to
gender-based discrimination and discrimination against persons born illegitimately, a
proposed state action must bear a substantial relationship to an important state interest.51
The “intermediate scrutiny” test is used in cases raising an equal protection challenge
“where a statute implicates both an important right and a semisuspect sic class not
accountable for its status.”52 Finally, strict scrutiny is applied when a statute discriminates
either against conduct that is a fundamental constitutional right or on the basis of a
suspect classification (race, religion, alienage); this test requires a statute to further a
compelling state interest which could not be achieved by other means.53
Unless a party establishes that the intermediate or strict scrutiny test is applicable,
a court typically uses the rational basis test as the proper approach when reviewing the
constitutionality of a statute under the equal protection clause. Of the three equal
protection tests, the rational basis test is the most deferential to the legislative branch of
government. Under rational basis review a statute satisfies the requirements of equal
protection if: “1) the classification created by the statute is rationally related to its
legislative purpose; 2) the members of the class are treated like those similarly situated;
and 3) the classification rests on some rational basis.”54 In other words, “a legislative
action not affecting a suspect class or infringing upon a fundamental right is upheld if it is

50

See Jenkins v. Meares, 394 S.E.2d 317 (S.C. 1990); Ex parte Estate of Evans, 384 S.E.2d 748 (S.C.
1989); Smith v. Smith, 354 S.E.2d 36 (S.C. 1987).
51
DeYoung v. Providence Medical Center, 960 P.2d 919, 921 (Wash. 1998).
52
Id. 921.
53
See Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 730 F.2d 392, 404 (5th Cir. 1984); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660
(1973).
54
Jenkins v. Meares, 394 S.E.2d at 319; Ex parte Estate of Evans, 384 S.E.2d at 749; Smith v. Smith, 354
S.E.2d at 39.

13

rationally related toward the advancement of any legitimate legislative interests of
society.”55 In addition, “to sustain the legislation” under the rational basis test, the
government only “must show a reasonably substantial interest and a scheme reasonably
closely tailored to achieving that interest.”56
In determining if legislation is constitutional under the equal protection clause,
only rights under the United States Constitution which are considered fundamental
warrant strict scrutiny protection. By contrast, non-fundamental rights are reviewed under
one of the lower levels of scrutiny. As a result, the determination of what constitutional
rights are classified as fundamental rights is therefore of paramount importance in equal
protection analysis. This issue has presented considerable controversy over the years for a
variety of reasons. Since a legislature may not regulate or punish the exercise of a
fundamental right unless strict scrutiny requirements are satisfied, if a statute regulates or
denies a fundamental right then it usually is struck down as unconstitutional under the
strict scrutiny test.
As noted above, equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative
classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right57 or operates to the particular disadvantage of a suspect class.58 The
Colorado Supreme Court has stated that “fundamental rights are essentially those rights
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which have been recognized as having a value essential to individual liberty in our
society.”59 Fundamental rights include voting, privacy, interstate travel, and the freedoms
of speech and association.60 A suspect class includes any group of people “saddled with
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian sic political process.”61 Suspect classifications include
race, alienage, and national origin.62 In addition, the suspect class must be a “discrete and
insular group”63 in need of legislative protection.
These categories and classifications undergo a constant state of analysis and are
open to re-consideration and review despite the principle of stare decisis. Justice
Thurgood Marshall almost always took a broader view than many other Justices of the
United States Supreme Court as to what should be considered a fundamental right. Justice
Marshall noted that “whether ‘fundamental’ or not ‘the right of the individual . . . to
engage in any of the common occupations of life’ has been repeatedly recognized by this
Court as falling within the concept of liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”64 Even as long ago as 1884 Justice Bradley stated that the right to work “is
an inalienable right; it was formulated as such under the phrase ‘pursuit of happiness’ in
the Declaration of Independence . . . This right is a large ingredient in the civil liberty of
the citizen.”65
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Nearly every state has a provision in their state's constitution stating that “no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”66 The
United States Supreme Court has also noted that “all men are entitled to the equal
protection of the law in their right to work for the support of themselves and families.”67
Finally, the Court has stated that “liberty means more than freedom from servitude, and
the constitutional guarantee is an assurance that the citizen shall be protected in the right
to use his powers of mind and body in any lawful calling.”68 Governmental employment,
however, has been determined not to be a fundamental constitutional right.69
However, there is room for argument about which rights under “life, liberty, or
property” are fundamental constitutional rights, and about whether particular
discrimination in a specific statute’s regulatory scheme is justified, thus ensuring a
healthy debate. As a result, the application of the equal protection clause to particular
statutory discrimination can present some controversy as well as great difficulty. The
United States Supreme Court has noted that “perfection in making the necessary
classifications is neither possible nor necessary”70 and that a statute “does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by [it] are imperfect.”71
If a legislative classification “rationally furthers the purposes identified by the
State, it does not violate the equal protection clause” when only the rational basis test is
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applicable.72 Under a rational basis review, the court must apply “a relatively relaxed
standard reflecting the Court’s awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions
is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one.”73 A classification established in a
regulatory statute by a legislature is presumed to be valid,74 and overcoming this burden
is quite difficult when only the rational basis test is applied. A statute's classification for
regulatory purposes must rest only on a reasonable basis to survive a rational basis test
challenge: for a statute to be held to violate equal protection under the rational basis test
“it must be shown that it has no reasonable or natural relation to the legislative
objective.”75
Many courts refer to the proposition that technical inequalities do not offend the
equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.76 Courts still adhere to the concept that
“there is no constitutional requirement that a regulation, in other respects permissible,
must reach every class to which it might be applied – and reject the proposition that a
legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none.77 The United
States Supreme Court has noted that “the Equal Protection Clause does not require that a
State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or (sic) not attacking the
problem at all. It is enough that the State’s action be rationally based and free from
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invidious discrimination.”78 In addition, courts follow the principle that “a statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it.”79
As equal protection analysis evolved, or was muddled (depending on one’s
perspective), Justice Thurgood Marshall frequently found himself dissenting from the
majority in cases involving equal protection challenges to a statute.80 A major problem
with the Court’s equal protection analysis, according to Justice Marshall, consisted in the
Court “apparently los[ing] interest in recognizing further ‘fundamental’ rights and
‘suspect’ classes.”81 As Justice Jackson noted two decades earlier, “the equal protection
clause ceases to assure either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable
difference that can be pointed out between those bound and those left free.”82 Although
some persons might not find a problem with the expansion of equal protection, in fact
believing that the number of suspect classes has been stretched too broadly, it would
seem counterintuitive to believe that mid-level and strict scrutiny equal protection
analyses now have been extended to every possible group that deserves such heightened
protection and that no further expansion of equal protection is necessary. Indeed,
consideration of increased protection for new groups is what resulted in recognition of
increased protection for the current groups that are now protected as suspect classes.
According to Justice Marshall, an approach of arbitrarily declining to further
expand heightened scrutiny to new classes fails to further the pursuit of equality under the
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equal protection clause.83 Justice Marshall noted that “all interests not ‘fundamental’ and
all classes not ‘suspect’ are not the same; and it is time for the Court to drop the pretense
that, for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, they are.”84
Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens often joined Justice Marshall in dissent in
equal protection cases. In a comment relevant to environmental law, one dissenting
opinion by Justice Stevens discusses the discoverability factor involved in application of
statutes of limitation in medical claim actions. Justice Stevens, writing in dissent,
commented:
The victim of medical malpractice frequently has no reason to believe that
his legal rights have been invaded simply because some misfortune has
followed medical treatment. Sometimes he may not even be aware of the
actual injury until years have passed; at other times, he may recognize the
harm but not know its cause; or . . . he may have knowledge of the injury
and its cause, but have no reason to suspect that a physician has been
guilty of any malpractice. In such cases – until today – the rule that has
been applied in the federal courts is that the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until after fair notice of the invasion of the plaintiff’s legal
rights.85
Justice Stevens also interestingly noted that even though statutes can be changed and
adjusted by legislatures, the Supreme Court should not enforce unjust results as a way of
providing the legislature with this authority.86
As a result, many medical malpractice claimants are now being told to be on the
lookout for something having gone wrong for them from the date of enactment of a new
statute of limitations. Justice Stevens seems to be suggesting that the U.S. Supreme Court
is encouraging potential medical malpractice claimants to look for potential legal claims
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rather than assume that other people with whom one is involved are not going to commit
tortious acts. The problem of discoverability of certain problems arising from medical
treatment of an illness is a major factor as to why statutes of repose for medical
malpractice claims should be considered anathema to the pursuit of justice. Therefore, it
should come as no surprise that there is little uniformity by courts in the application of
equal protection standards to statutes of limitation and statutes of repose.
Arguments in Support of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose
In Kansas, the justification for statutes of repose mirrors that of many other states.
A Kansas court has stated that medical statutes of repose mark, with no small degree of
political spin, “the legislature’s attempt to assure quality health care . . . by combating the
rapidly rising cost of medical malpractice insurance and the increasing reluctance of
insurance underwriters to underwrite medical professionals.”87 Another court in Kansas
went on to conclude “there is a reasonable basis for treating malpractice actions against
health care providers differently from cases involving other tortfeasors.”88 A North
Dakota court lamented that there was “an insurance crisis facing North Dakota products
manufacturers” and a concomitant “crisis situation.”89 In Texas, a court has claimed that
statutes of repose “are specifically designed to protect [manufacturers] . . . from
protracted and extended vulnerability to lawsuits.”90 In Washington, a court has observed
that “by enacting an eight-year statute of repose, the Legislature intended to protect
insurance companies while ‘hopefully not resulting in too many individuals not getting
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compensated.’”91 Again, these types of justifications for a statute of repose limited to
particular types of legal claims against specific categories of persons are applicable to
any type of legal claim against any type of business or professional.
In upholding statutes of repose, “courts have stressed the need to create a
reasonable limit on the legal consequences of a wrong and the difficulty in proof of old
claims.”92 Many courts have concluded that “a rational relation exists between the shorter
limitation period for health care providers and the legitimate objective of providing
quality health care.”93 Lower courts find encouragement in the United States Supreme
Court’s position that liability limitations with an economic purpose are constitutional
unless the legislature acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.94 Support for statutes of
repose also has been found in the proposition that “when an act has an economic purpose,
limitations created by it must be upheld unless they are irrational and arbitrary.”95 In
addition, courts have stated that “limiting the time within which actions may be brought
has in numerous cases been held to be a rational, non-arbitrary means of achieving
economic ends.”96 Inevitably, economic considerations seep into courts’ analysis in
support of statutes of repose.
Furthermore, a large number of judges are hesitant to issue any judgment or order
without specific legislative authority. This view is often stated in this manner (or a
similar manner): “this court cannot, after all, legislate – no matter how admirable its
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objectives might be in doing so.”97 Courts also state that “sympathy for the plaintiff in
this case, and those similarly situated, is not enough to compel this court”98 to overturn a
valid statute.
Counter-Arguments/Criticism
Keeping costs down, however, is neither universally recognized nor accepted as a
legitimate justification for a statute of repose. One argument against statutes of repose for
product liability claims is that “product liability insurance rates are set on the basis of
countrywide, rather than individual state, experience,” and “that there is little an
individual state can do to solve the problems caused by products liability.”99 Another
argument is based on numerous studies which have shown that “it is reported that 97% of
all product related accidents occur within six years of the time the product is purchased
and that a statute of repose precluding suit for actions accruing more than ten years after
the product is sold will not significantly impact the product liability crisis.100 As a result,
more judges are starting to agree that “some rational basis must be advanced for the
selection of the specific period of years in a statute of repose's ‘bar’ or ‘repose,’ other
than the economic interests . . . of insurance companies and physicians.”101
A state legislature's goal of keeping illegitimate claims from clogging the judicial
branch of a state government certainly is a valid concern. However, statutes of repose
seem to be designed primarily to prevent people from even having a day in court to try
the substantive merits of a claim. If a claim is without substantive merit, without support
97
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from the benefit of witnesses' memories or documents, then the claim probably will fail
on the substantive merits. The concern of a state legislature to keep claims from even
being heard on the substantive merits in a state court seems an unfair and unreasonable
basis for enactment of a statute of repose.
A common judicial argument in support of a statute of repose is the argument
that if one type of claim is granted or allowed, then "the sky will fall" as every claim
necessarily will be allowed to be tried in state courts and "the slippery slope of chaos"
would therefore reign supreme.102 This broad sweeping fear is unfounded. There is no
reason to believe that all private insurance carriers will stop offering liability insurance to
any or all businesses and/or professionals if there are no statutes of repose for product,
business or professional liability claims in any state.
Furthermore, health care would continue to be available to most individuals and
would be the highest quality even if statutes of repose for medical malpractice claims
were abolished or extended. Those who espouse the virtues of the free market should
surely recognize that there will always be a demand for quality health care; and thus there
will always be physicians willing to provide such care.
In fact, the very basis of the exceptions in statutes of repose for asbestos and
breast implants demonstrates that the decision to exclude some types of products liability
claims for long latency illnesses, while allowing certain other claims to be tried in a
state’s courts, is illogical and inconsistent. This inconsistency cannot be said to be a
rational basis for a regulatory distinction under the equal protection clause and therefore
should not be followed by a court when a statute of repose is challenged on equal
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protection grounds. At the very least a statute of repose should have a period of repose
somewhere between ten to thirty years (a period that is more reasonable than ten years)
rather than between five to eight years (a less rational repose period).103
In many cases, state statutes of repose seem to have been enacted for the benefit
of the customers of the insurance industry. For example, one state court found that “the
legislative history [of that state’s statute of repose for medical malpractice claims] makes
it crystal clear that the statute of repose was designed to remedy the rising cost of
malpractice insurance."104 There is nothing wrong with assisting certain professionals and
businessmen from attempting to control the costs of their insurance premiums and
helping insurance companies to formulate a business plan to provide for the broadest
possible coverage at the lowest possible costs. There is also nothing wrong with assisting
a business to make reasonable profits. However, denying an injured person, who
allegedly has been harmed by the tortious conduct of a professional or a businessman, the
opportunity to try a meritorious claim on its substantive merits in court is anathema to the
principles of freedom and justice that form the foundations of American jurisprudence.
A statute of repose that favors the rights of insured professionals and businessmen
and their insurance companies’ rather than the rights of injured individuals cannot be
justified by any rational policy. To avoid the appearance of unjustifiable favoritism of
businessmen and professionals, courts have upheld statutes of repose on the more
palpable sounding position that “the Equal Protection Clause does not demand for
purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker [sic]
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actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.”105
This position is weak because to uphold a statute of repose, the underlying purpose of the
legislature should be identified by the court and found to be irrational; however, the
intent of the legislature may not be articulated explicitly on the face of a statute or in its
legislative history, leaving a court to speculate as to the legislature's reasons for
enactment of the statute even when the court is predisposed to dismiss a meritorious
claim.
If a legal claim is stale or old, with a lack of witnesses or memories to support it,
then this claim either will be barred by a statute of limitations or probably is not going to
succeed on its substantive merits in a trial in court of such claim. There is really no need
to rely upon a statute of repose to preemptively deny a claimant a day in court to try such
a claim on the substantive merits.
Many state constitutions have an “open courts” provision to allow its citizens a
day in court to try their claims on the merits106 but many courts have held that statutes of
repose do not violate a state constitution's open courts provision because a statute of
repose does not deny every injured party access to the courts, although the access
permitted under the statute of repose only is for a limited time.107 In addition, many state
constitutions contain an “open access to courts” provision; however, arguments based
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upon alleged violation of this principle have met with little success.108 Many courts have
concluded that “there is no absolute right of access to the courts. All that is required is a
reasonable right of access to the courts – a reasonable opportunity to be heard.”109
A similar right to a remedy provision is also contained in many state constitutions,
and this type of provision has served as a successful basis for some challenges to a state
statute of repose.110 This result could be due in part to the often heard colloquial: ‘a right
without a remedy is no right at all.’ A state constitutional right to a remedy and a statute
of repose seemingly are exclusive of one another because a person injured after the
statutory period of repose is “left without a remedy for the injury.”111 However, a state
legislature can restrict a time for filing a claim without violating a state constitution's
right to a remedy provision so long as “it affords a reasonable time or fair opportunity to
preserve a claimant’s rights . . . or if the amendment does not bar a remedy.”112 But
neither the federal judiciary nor a state legislature should arbitrarily limit a claimant from
even having a day in court to try the substantive merits of a claim.
However, reliance upon a state constitutional right to a remedy is an inadequate
and limited approach to invalidate unjust statutes of repose. This conclusion is due in part
to the fact that not every state constitution has such a provision and also because
unconstitutional statutes of repose should be invalidated by all courts in their entirety all
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at once; rather than only invalidated in states that have an appropriate right to a remedy
provision in the state's constitution.113
Consequently, statutes of repose that apply only to particular types of legal claims
should be invalidated by courts as unconstitutional in violation of the equal protection
clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution, not occasionally
invalidated in some state courts on state constitutional grounds. For example, a decision
by a particular state's appellate court invalidating a state statute of repose that bans claims
against architects and builders might not necessarily support a challenge to a different
statute of repose in that state governing claims in other fields.
An insurance company should draft its policies in ways that spread its costs of
doing business among all its policy holders rather than simply closing the courthouse
doors on many insured individual’s claims forever. Insurance policies could be structured
so that an insured's premiums stay level each year (or even decrease), and only rise if a
suit against the company is actually brought by an insured. Insurance rates should not
necessarily increase for all of a company's policy holders every year. Even the necessity
for profits and reasonable business growth does not require double digit growth in profits
every year.
Under this author's suggested approach to statutes of repose, potential defendants
would still have insurance coverage, insurance providers would enjoy reasonable profits,
and the courts would be available to try insurance claims on their substantive merits if
harm occurs to an insured. In addition, a potential claimant, whose claims are not barred
113
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by the statute of limitations, would at least have an opportunity to have a day in court to
try the substantive merits of potential claims and legislatures could focus their time on
other matters. Because statutes of limitations would still bar stale claims, by no means are
the judicial floodgates going to be opened under this author's approach to statutes of
repose. Just because a potential claimant is allowed a day in court does not translate into
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
In addition to arguments that statutes of repose are unconstitutional, claimants
have attempted to argue that statutes of repose violate federal due process.114 A Kansas
court, however, concluded “although [a statute of repose] works a hardship on particular
plaintiffs, there is no violation of due process in its application.”115 Furthermore, medical
malpractice statutes of repose have been held not to violate due process since the
legislature’s concern with shortening the lapse of time between treatment of a patient and
a potential medical malpractice suit is considered a permissible legislative objective.116
Equal Protection and Statutes of Repose
The most often stated general justification for the constitutionality of statutes of
repose is the oft-quoted statement that “it is no requirement of equal protection that all
evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.”117 Although the creation of
classifications at all might seem counterintuitive to any notion of equality, this typical
judicial justification for not invalidating, on equal protection grounds, an act of the
legislature, is merely an excuse for a court evading equal protection analysis. Courts also
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evade their responsibility to ensure equal protection by reviewing a statute's regulatory
classifications’ under a standard of “reasonableness,” granting the classification “fairly
broad leeway” and not questioning the legislature “unless the classification is clearly
arbitrary and has no rational basis.”118
Many courts, in upholding a statute of repose against an equal protection
challenge, offer, in consolation, the statement that “we do not necessarily agree
philosophically with the results we reach. We can only construe the statute as it is, not as
we think it ought to be.”119 In one case the Sixth Circuit concluded that “we cannot say
that the legislature’s decision to limit § 29-28-103 to those defendants in the
manufacturing and distribution chain, who have control over the cost and availability of
products, is irrational.”120
These rationales are overly absolute and naively simplistic because they fail to
explain why a statute of repose is being limited only to certain types of claims and to
such claims only against certain categories of persons. A court should not simply be a
rubber stamp for the legislature. Every court has an inherent duty to ensure that every law
passed by the legislature conforms to the guiding principles set forth in both the state and
federal constitutions. A court has the duty to strike down statutes that are
unconstitutional; legislatures cannot be depended upon to enact constitutional statutes
every time.
Other rationales offered by courts in support of statutes of repose include limiting
“claims that would be difficult to prove due to difficulty of finding witnesses with
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knowledge of events of ten years before.”121 Also, one court has stated that “long lapses
of time result in the absence and unavailability of critical witnesses as well as faded
memories.”122 As mentioned earlier, there is a “strong and legitimate interest in
preventing litigation of stale claims.”123 However, this interest is fully achieved through
statutes of limitations.
In addition, statutes of repose are ostensibly designed to “protect defendants and
the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously
impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading
memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise.124 This interest also is fully
achieved by statutes of limitation. Finally, courts also want “to avoid the difficulty in
proof and record keeping which suits involving [older] claims impose.”125 These types of
interests are fully achieved by statutes of limitations, and these arguments are applicable
to all types of legal claims, not just specific types of legal claims against certain
categories of defendants. As a result, these policy reasons should not provide justification
for a statute of repose that is limited to a specific type of legal claim against a specific
category of persons.
The future of Statutes of Repose and Equal Protection Analysis
Some courts have concluded “that there was no close correspondence between the
‘legislative goal of providing certainty in litigation or of reducing insurance costs’ and
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the classification established by the statute of repose.”126 Consequently, amendments to
statutes of repose, based upon changes in attitudes and progress in understanding how to
better take care of society as a whole, should occur as inevitable aspects of the human
experience. To paraphrase Thomas Jefferson, we should no more expect an adult to wear
the clothes they were given as a child than to expect all laws from the past to adequately
govern the society of today.
An assertion that a judge does not have authority to invalidate a statute of repose
is no more a valid argument than an argument that a judge is compelled to interpret a
statute of repose a certain way. Furthermore, when considering the constitutionality of a
statute, a court “may consider unarticulated, as well as articulated, legislative purposes
and goals.”127 It is imperative for a court to determine the constitutionality of a statute of
repose rather than simply determine the legislative intent behind the statute.
Statutes of repose also might be invalidated under the equal protection clause's
strict scrutiny test on the grounds that the statute is infringing upon a newly-recognized
fundamental right. Courts should recognize a new fundamental constitutional right that is
infringed by a state statute of repose applicable to environmental and toxic torts claims
and would be protected by the strict scrutiny test of equal protection. The right to a clean
environment should be considered a fundamental right that is infringed by a state statute
of repose that applies to an environmental or toxic torts claim and that is protected under
strict scrutiny, since it is the foundation for many of the other recognized fundamental
rights. This right should include the right to protection of personal bodily integrity.
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An environmental or toxic torts claim seeking damages from a disease caused by
exposure to a hazardous substance should be considered within this fundamental right to
protection of bodily integrity. The Supreme Court already recognizes a fundamental right
to bodily integrity.128 Bodily integrity is certainly furthered by a clean environment. Once
the right to a clean environment and a healthy body are recognized as fundamental, any
statute affecting these rights would be reviewed by a court under strict scrutiny. Under
strict scrutiny evaluation, statutes of repose that apply to an environmental or toxic torts
claim related to the right to a clean environment or to a healthy body would be found to
be the unconstitutional leviathans that they are.
A court, however, is unlikely to accept any argument in favor of either a right to a
clean and healthy body or a right to a clean environment as a fundamental right, all the
more so given that access to a public education is not recognized as a fundamental right
in this country.129 Nonetheless, protection of health, education and environment should be
recognized as fundamental rights even if current courts are reluctant to so rule. If this
argument is accepted by the courts, there can be no rational basis for a statute of repose
that provides an exception for an illness from exposure to asbestos or silicon gel
implants, while not providing an exception to claims for illnesses resulting from exposure
to environmental pollutants and toxins. The minority of courts, which have stated that
“when we are dealing with human life and safety we believe that more is required for a
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justification than a reference to the economics of suppliers of goods,”130 are “ahead of the
tide” in this respect.
The argument, that a right not specifically delineated by the Constitution is a right
that should not be recognized by the courts as a fundamental right protected by strict
scrutiny analysis, is overly simplistic and all too often an excuse for inaction. Justice
Douglas commented that “there is, of course, not a word in the Constitution, unlike many
modern constitutions, concerning the right of the people to education or to work or to
recreation by swimming or otherwise. Those rights, like the right to pure air and pure
water, may well be rights retained by the people’ under the Ninth Amendment.”131 Justice
Marshall would agree, having stated “it will not do to suggest that the ‘answer’ to
whether an interest is fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis is always to
be determined by whether that interest ‘is a right . . . explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution.’ I would like to know where the Constitution guarantees the right to
procreate, or the right to vote in state elections, or the right to an appeal from a criminal
conviction.”132 This would later prove prophetic as the Supreme Court in Plyler
suggested that the Constitution guarantees certain rights, such as the right to participate
equally in state elections, even though they are not ‘explicitly or implicitly guaranteed’
by the Constitution.133 Furthermore, “the Constitution does not forbid the creation of new
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rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible
legislative object.”134
Although the United States Congress has not yet enacted any federal statute of
repose, any federal statute of repose would be subject to an Equal Protection challenge
because the Fifth Amendment due process clause is interpreted as containing an equal
protection requirement applicable to the federal government.135 When a federal statute is
challenged on equal protection grounds, the court can find that the United States
Congress had implied objectives for enacting the statute without specifically stating the
legislature's objectives in enacting a statute.136 For example, attempting to assist
manufacturers with their business plans is a legitimate governmental interest; however,
passing a statute of repose limiting liability of a business to only a few years in order to
protect potential business defendants is unreasonable. Such statutes are unconstitutional
because they deny the fundamental rights to due process, equal protection and bodily
integrity guaranteed by the Constitution.
Although a federal court is “bound by plain language” if “Congress did not
express a contrary intent,”137 Congress cannot possibly legislate for every contingency; it
is no giant leap of judicial effort to interpret what the intent and logical extrapolations of
a federal statute may allow. A statute of repose may be both specific (the type of
manufacturer or industry protected), yet also hopelessly vague (why are certain products
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granted different periods of repose?) A court cannot hope to glean a rationale as to the
Congressional intent for such distinctions since they are arbitrary and without a rational
basis. The reason for the federal separation of powers doctrine is for one branch of
government not to have too much power. For federal courts to be hand-tied by the U.S.
Congress is not what the founders of the United States of America intended.138
A legislature should not have free reign to pass unconstitutional statutes of repose,
which courts blithely uphold as constitutional without any adherence to constitutional
principles. A blind and simplistic presumption that all statutes of repose are constitutional
is dangerously naïve. One need only look at legislation from the antebellum American
South to see why this posture is fraught with danger.139
Claims based upon exposure to asbestos and silicon gel breast implants are
already granted exceptions to some state statutes of repose based on long latency periods.
These exceptions would seem to indicate that claims based upon exposure to any
hazardous substance with a long latency period should be granted an exception as well.
In § 9658 of CERCLA,140 Congress did attempt to nullify unjust statutes of
limitation by providing exceptions to state statutes of limitations.141 Federal courts,
however, have found ways to hold that state statutes of repose do not violate § 9658 of
CERCLA, which states: “if the applicable limitations period for such action (as specified
in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date
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which is earlier than the federally required commencement date, such period shall
commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of the date specified in
such State statute.”142 The 5th Circuit has commented that “CERCLA’s legislative history
indicates Congress intended for § 9658 to preempt a state statute of limitations that
deprives a plaintiff who suffers a long-latency disease caused by the release of a
hazardous substance of his cause of action, but not to preempt a state statute of
repose.”143 However, § 9658 does not specifically refer or apply to statutes of repose; as a
result, many courts will not use the statute of limitation language in § 9658 as indicating
congressional intent to strike down statutes of repose.
A legislature should not be viewed as acting rationally if it enacts a statute of
repose under which a claim based on an exposure to toxic environmental carcinogens that
result in breast cancer would not be permitted while a claim based on breast cancer
resulting from a silicon gel implant would be permitted to be tried by that statute of
repose. No rational distinction can be made between long latency periods for exposure to
asbestos versus exposure to another environmental toxin. Any such distinction should be
found by a court to be irrational. The asbestos and silicon gel breast implant exceptions in
statutes of repose allow a right to trial of a claim in court to some injured individuals,
while denying a day in court to other injured persons. Courts should not sit back and do
nothing in such a situation on the grounds that only the legislature can act in the area of
statutes of repose.144 Courts should strike down unconstitutional statutes of repose rather
than wait for the legislatures to enact a conforming statute. Often, a court decision
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striking down an unconstitutional statute is the only action that will galvanize a
legislature to act properly.
Conclusion: Courts should hold Statutes of Repose to be Invalid under the Constitution
Courts should hold that a statute of repose that only applies to a particular type of
legal claim (such as only to product liability claims or only to product liability claims
other than asbestos and/or silicon gel breast implant cases) is invalid under the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution because it irrationally discriminates
against only particular types of legal claims in violation of the rational basis test required
under equal protection. In addition, if a state has a statute or statutes of repose that
apply/applies to all legal claims, this statute or statutes, in order to comply with the equal
protection clause’s rational basis test, must establish a reasonable repose period for each
type of legal claim.145 A reasonable repose period for each type of claim should be based
upon the relevant latency or discovery period for the disease or injury upon which a
particular legal claim is based.146
Statutes of repose that have an unreasonably short period of repose should be
invalidated by the courts in the states in which they are still permitted. At the very least,
the period of repose in a statute of repose should be lengthened by legislatures, either as a
gradual step or as a compromise. While such statutory amendment is a legislative task,
courts should highlight the need for such legislative action by holding that a statute of
repose is unconstitutional when the statute has a discoverability period that is
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unreasonably short when compared to the latency period or discoverability of the disease
upon which the plaintiff's underlying legal claim is based.
The fact that in some states asbestos and gel implants are granted an exception to
statutes of repose, based chiefly on a long latency period, would seem to negate any
logical basis for a statute of repose that bars, after a period of time shorter than this long
latency period, a claim arising from injuries caused by a similar product or exposure to a
substance with a similarly long latency period. Many diseases and illnesses resulting after
a long latency period share several facets with the diseases and illnesses resulting from
asbestos or gel implant exposure. Distinctions drawn in a statute of repose between these
recognized exceptions and other illnesses are irrational. A characterization or
classification that is irrational or has no rational basis is a violation of the equal
protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
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